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This  paper  considers  the  welfare  consequences  of  two  particularly  simple  rules  for 
monetary  policy:  an  interest rate  peg  and  a  money  growth  peg.  The  model  economy 
consists  of  a  real  side  that  is  the  standard  real  business  cycle  model,  and  a  monetary 
side  that  amounts  to  imposing  cash-in-advance  constraints  on  certain  market  transactions. 
The  paper  also  considers  the  effect  of  assuming  a  rigidity  in  the  typical  household's 
cash  savings choice.  The  competitive equilibrium  of  the  economy  is  not  Pareto  efficient, 
partly  because  of  two  intertemporal  distortions:  a  distortion  on  the  capital 
accumulation decision,  and  a  distortion on  portfolio  choice  that  arises  from  the  assumed 
rigidity.  The  principal  result  of  the  paper  is  that  the  interest  rate  rule  (but  not  the 
money  growth  rule)  entirely  eliminates  these  two  intertemporal  distortions  and  is  thus 
the benevolent central banker' s policy  choice. 
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One  of  the  oldest debates  in monetary  economics concerns the  appropriate target  for 
monetary  policy:  Should  central  banks  target  money  supply  growth  rates  or  nominal 
interest  rates?  Friedman  (1990)  provides  an  introduction  to  this  voluminous  literature. 
Much of  the early work follows Poole (1970) and Sargent and Wallace (1975) and conducts 
the  analysis  within  an  ISILM-type  aggregative  framework.  In  contrast,  the  more  recent 
studies,  led  by  Sargent  and  Wallace  (1982),  address  the  issue  in  the  context  of  general 
equilibrium models.  The  present paper  belongs  to  this  latter  tradition.  In the  monetary 
economy  analyzed  below,  the  competitive  equilibrium  is  not  Pareto  efficient,  but  is 
instead  distorted  relative  to  the  Pareto  optimum  by  one  intratemporal  distortion  and  two 
intertemporal  distortions.  The  paper  considers  the  welfare  consequences  of  two  simple 
monetary  policy  rules:  1)  a  constant  money  growth  rate  (in  which  case  the  nominal 
interest  rate  is  endogenous),  and  2)  a  constant  nominal  interest  rate  (in  which  case  the 
money  growth  rate  is  endogenous).  The  principal  result  is  that  an  interest  rate  rule, 
but  not  a  money  growth  rule,  entirely  eliminates the  two  intertemporal  distortions and  is 
thus the benevolent central banker's policy  choice. 
Our  analysis  is  carried  out  in  an  economy  in  which  the  real  side  is  the  standard 
real  business  cycle  model.  Money  is  introduced by  imposing  cash-in-advance constraints 
on  the  representative  household's  consumption  purchases  and  the  representative  firm's 
wage  bill.  As  is  well  known,  real  variables  in this  monetary  economy  generally  behave 
quite  differently  from  their  counterparts  in  the  corresponding  real  economy  run  by  a 
Pareto  planner.  For  example,  the  cash  constraint  on  labor  demand  imposes  an  inflation 
tax  on  labor  market  activity  and  thus  lowers  equilibrium work  effort  (see,  for  example, 
Cooley and  Hansen  [1989]).  In contrast to this  intratemporal distortion, we  focus on two 
potential  intertemporal  distortions  arising  in  the  monetary  economy.  First,  the  cash 
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particular,  capital  accumulation  is  affected  by  the  time  path  of  the  nominal  rate  of 
interest  (see  Fischer  [I9791 and  Fuerst  [1994a]).  Second,  a  non-Fisherian  component  of 
interest  rate  determination  enters  into  the  model  under  the  assumption  that  the 
household's  cash  versus  bank  deposit  portfolio  decision  is  made  in  the  absence  of  full 
contemporaneous  information.  Models  incorporating  this  type  of  portfolio  rigidity  are 
something  of  a  growth  industry,  partly  because  they  are  consistent  with  an  increase  in 
the  money  growth rate  (temporarily) driving down the  nominal  rate  of  interest  (see  Lucas 
[1990],  Christian0  and  Eichenbaum  [1992,  19941,  Fuerst  [1992,  1994b1,  and  Carlstrom 
[1994]).  The  objective of  the  present  paper  is  to  show  how  a  simple  interest  rate  rule 
can eliminate both this portfolio rigidity and  the capital accumulation distortion. 
A  common  criticism  of  interest  rate  rules  is  their  potential  for  giving  rise  to 
price-level  indeterminacy  and  sunspot  behavior.  For  example,  Smith  (1988)  argues  that 
one  possible justification  for the  money  growth regime in the  Sargent and  Wallace  (1982) 
environment  is  that  it  precludes  the  possibility  of  sunspot  equilibria.  Issues  of  this 
type do  arise below,  but  we  sidestep some of  them  by  limiting our  analysis to  stationary 
rational  expectations  equilibria.  In  particular,  we  ignore  the  possibility  of  self- 
fulfilling hyperdeflations and  hyperinflations.  We  make  this  choice because:  a)  we  have 
nothing new  to contribute in this regard, and b)  as demonstrated by  Woodford (1994) in a 
comparable  environment  without  capital,  these  equilibria  are  not  unique  to  interest  rate 
regimes,  and  in  fact  are  in  some  sense  more  likely  under  money  growth  regimes.  Even 
within  the  class  of  stationary  equilibria,  price-level  indeterminacy  does  arise  below. 
In  two  of  the  three  model  variants,  this  indeterminacy  is  purely  nominal  and  would  thus 
have  no  effect  on  real  welfare  comparisons.  A  novel  result  is  that  in  the  case  of 
portfolio  rigidities,  this  indeterminacy  becomes  a  real  indeterminacy,  so  that  some  care 
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The  next  section  lays  out  the  basic  model.  Section  3  addresses  the  interest  rate 
versus  money  growth  issue  in  a  deterministic setting,  while  the  two  sections  that  follow 
carry  out  the  corresponding  analysis  in  increasingly  complicated  economic  environments. 
Section  4  considers  the  case  of  stochastic  shocks  without  portfolio  rigidities,  while 
section  5  considers  the  case  of  stochastic  shocks  with  portfolio  rigidities.  Section  5 
also  presents  some  computational  results  of  a  numerical  welfare  comparison  of  the  two 
monetary  policy  regimes.  Section  6  discusses  the  real  indeterminacy  problem  mentioned 
above, and  section 7 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
The  economy  consists  of  numerous  agents  of  three  types:  households,  firms,  and 
intermediaries.  Since  all  behave  as  atomistic  competitors,  we  will  restrict  our 
discussion  to  a  representative  agent  of  each  type.  We  will  first  describe  the 
optimization problem of  each agent, then turn to  an analysis of  equilibrium behavior. 
The  typical  household  is  infinitely  lived,  with  preferences  over  consumption  (ct) 
and leisure (I-Lt) given by 
00 
where  Eo  is  the  expectation operator,  E  (0,l) is  the personal  discount rate,  Lt  denotes 
household  labor  supply,  and  the  household's  leisure  endowment  is  normalized  to  unity. 
The household begins period  t  with  Mt  dollars and  must  decide how  much of  this cash to 
keep on hand for contemporaneous consumption and how much to deposit in the intermediary, 
where  it  will  earn  a  gross  nominal  return  of  Rt.  Let  Nt  denote  the  amount  of  cash 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9504deposited  in  the  intermediary,  a  choice  that  we  assume  is  fixed  until  the  next  period. 
An  important issue  below  is the  information the  household has  when making this portfolio 
decision.  We  consider  two  distinct  possibilities:  In  the  case  of  a  portfolio  rigidity 
(PR),  the  household  selects  Nt  before  knowing  the  current innovations  in technology  and 
government  spending,  while  in  the  case  of  no  portfolio  rigidity  (NPR),  the  household 
knows  the  current  innovations  when  choosing  Nt.  In  either  case,  after  making  its 
portfolio  decision,  the  household  makes  its  consumption and  labor  supply  decisions  with 
full  information on  the  current  state  of  the  world.  Consumption purchases  are  subject to 
a  modified  cash-in-advance  constraint.  In  particular,  households  can  use  cash  not 
deposited in the  intermediary, as well as  current labor income,  to purchase consumption: 
Ptct 5  Mt  - Nt  + WtLt 
where Pt and  Wt  denote the price level and  nominal wage, respectively.  At  the end  of  the 
period,  the  household  receives  a  cash  dividend  payment  from  both  the  firm  and 
intermediary,  as  well  as  principal  plus  interest  on  its  deposits  at  the  intermediary. 
Hence, 
f  i 
Mt+l = Mt  + (Ril)Nt  + WtLt  + nt + I'It - Ptct - PtTt 
f  where  nt  and  nfi  denote  the  profits  of  the  representative  firm  and  intermediary, 
respectively, and  Tt denotes the real  lump-sum taxes imposed by  the fiscal authority. 
The  representative  firm  uses  its  accumulated  capital  stock  (kt)  and  the  labor  it 
hires  from  households  (Ht)  to  produce  current  output  via  its  stochastic  production 
technology:  etf(kt,Ht),  where  €It  is  the  time  t  state  of  technology  and  f  is  a 
neoclassical  production  function.  The  firm  keeps  part  of  this  output  to  augment  its 
capital  stock  (It)  and  sells  the  rest  to  households  (on  a  cash  basis)  for  consumption. 
The  firm  also  faces  a  cash  constraint in that  the  current wage  bill  must  be  financed  with 
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at  the  end  of  the  period.  The  firm  chooses  its  production  and  investment  levels  to 
maximize the  discounted value of  its dividend payments: 
f  with nt and It given by 
Note  that  in  the  terms  of  Lucas  and  Stokey  (1987),  labor  is  a  cash  good  for  the  firm, 
while  investment  is  a  credit  good.  The  technology  variable  is  assumed  to  evolve 
according to the  following stochastic process: 
where  pg  is  the  autocorrelation  coefficient,  ct  is  an  i.i.d.  shock,  and  the  nonstochastic 
steady state of  Bt  is 8. 
Finally,  the  typical  intermediary  accepts  deposits  of  Nt  from  households  and 
receives  the  current  monetary  injection  of  M;(Gil)  from  the  central  bank,  where  Gt  = 
/MS, and M:  is the money  supply per household.  All  of  this cash is then loaned out  MS+I  t 
to firms at the rate Rt.  This implies that IIi = R~M:(G~-~). 
To  close  our  description  of  the  model,  we  need  to  specify  fiscal  and  monetary 
policy.  To begin with the  former, real  government expenditures are exogenous and  follow 
the  stochastic process 
gt  = (l-pg)g + Pggt-l  + ^It 
where  p  is  the  autocorrelation  coefficient,  yt  is  an  i.i.d.  shock,  and  the  nonstochastic 
g 
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government debt by  assuming that  Tt  = gt V t. 
We consider two schemes for the conduct of  monetary policy.  Under a money growth 
rule,  Gt  = Gss  V  t  and  Rt  is  endogenous.  In contrast, under  an interest rate regime, Rt 
= R  V  t  and  Gt  is endogenous.  For ease of  comparison, we  set R  = Gss/P,  so that  the 
nonstochastic steady  state of  the model is unaffected by  the choice of  monetary regime. 
There  are  four  markets  in  this  economy:  the  goods market,  the  labor  market,  the 
money  market,  and  the  credit market.  The respective market-clearing conditions are given 
by 
The  model's  equilibrium  is  defined  by  the  household's  and  firm's optimization conditions 
evaluated  at  these  equilibrium conditions.  To  make  the  model  stationary,  we  normalize 
all  nominal  variables  by  Mt  and  define  the  following  new  variables:  pt  = P  tt  /M , w  t  = 
Wt/Mt,  nt  = Nt/Mt.  Given the  timing  of  the  model,  a  more  natural  choice might  be  to 
normalize  by  Mt+l,  since  this  represents  the  money  stock  available  for  time  t 
transactions.  However, in the  PR  model,  this  choice would  not be  appropriate because  Nt 
must be chosen before Mt+  is known.  Hence, to maintain symmetry between the two models, 
we  will  use  Mt  as  our  normalization.  An  equilibrium is  given by  the  Lt,  kt+l,  wt,  pt, 
nt,  and Gt  % stochastic processes that  satisfy the following Euler equations: 
EsUc(')'pt  = EsP%Uc0+ l)/pt +  1Gt  (1) 
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where Es  = Et in the  NPR  model  and Es  = Et-l  in the PR model. 
We  will  now  turn  to  an  analysis  of  the  economy's  behavior  under  the  alternative 
monetary  regimes,  beginning  with  a deterministic version of  the model and then turning to 
the NPR  and PR cases.  I 
3. The Deterministic Case 
Suppose  that  et  = 9  and  gt  = g  V  t,  and  that  monetary  policy  is  nonstochastic. 
Then, solving (2),  (3), and  (5) for pt, wt, and nt, we  have: 
Pt  = Gt/ct 
wt  = ULGt/CtUc 
nt  = ULGtLt/ctUc  - (Gt-1). 
Substituting  these  back  into  the  remaining  three  equations,  we  are  left  with  the 
following three Euler equations in Lt, kt+ l, and Gt  g_r Rt: 
Uc(')ct  = RtPUc(t +  l)ct +  1lGt +  1  (7) 
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distortion  on  work  effort  in  equation  (8)  that  arises  because  of  the  transactions 
constraint  on  the  firm's  wage  bill.  Second,  notice  that  by  substituting  (1)  into  (6), 
the  capital  accumulation  equation  (9)  collapses  to  something  resembling  the  optimal 
growth  equation.  The  difference  is  that  the  two  respective  marginal  utilities  are  scaled 
by  the  corresponding  nominal  rates  of  interest.  This  intertemporal  distortion  arises 
because  of  the  cash  constraint  on  consumption.  If  the  firm  decides  to  increase  its 
capital  stock  by  one  unit,  then  there  will  be  pt  fewer  dollars  to  distribute  to  the 
household  at  the  end  of  period  t.  At  the  beginning  of  period  t,  the  household  could 
borrow  against  this  expected  dividend  flow  and  finance  p{Rt  dollars  of  consumption. 
Hence,  the  private  utility  cost  of  increasing  capital  by  one  unit  is  Uc(t)/Rt.  Next 
period,  this  capital  will  produce  a  profit  flow  of  pt+ l[Ofk(t+ 1)  +(l-6)]  dollars  that  will 
be  paid  out  to  households  at  the  end  of  the  period.  At  the  beginning  of  t+l, the 
household  could  borrow  against  this  cash  flow  and  finance  pt + [Ofk(t +  1) +  (1-6)]/Rt + 
dollars  of  consumption.  Hence,  the  private  utility  gain  of  increasing  capital  by  one 
unit  is  P[Ofk(t +  1) +  (1-6)]Uc(t +  l)/Rt +  l.  The  optimizing  firm  equates  these  two  private 
margins.  Note  that  both  of  these  private  margins  are  distorted  relative  to  the  social 
margins  by  the  corresponding nominal  rate  of  interest.  This  observation is  formalized in 
Proposition 1 below. 
Consider the  economy's behavior under  two  different monetary regimes:  i)  a money 
growth regime in which Gt  = Gss V t, and  ii) an interest rate regime in which Rf  = GSs@ 
V  t.  Note  that  the  economy's  unique  steady-state  capital  stock  (kss)  is  identical under 
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different under the two policies.  Under  a money growth regime, Gt  = Gss V t, and (7)-(9) 
determine  the  paths  for  Lt,  kt+l,  and  Rt.  Note  in  particular  that  Rt  is  generally  not 
constant  along  the  accumulation path.'  In  contrast,  under  an  interest  rate  rule,  (8)-(9) 
determine the paths for kt+  and Lt, while (7) then determines Gt+ l.  We immediately have 
the  following: 
Proposition  1:  In  the  deterministic model,  if  monetary  policy  operates under  an  interest 
rate  regime,  equation (9)  collapses  to  the  accumulation  equation from  the  optimal  growth 
problem,  that  is,  the  intertemporal  distortion  on  capital  accumulation  is  entirely 
eliminated. 
Proposition  2:  In  the  deterministic  model,  if  labor  supply  is  inelastic,  the  optimal 
monetary policy  is  an interest rate rule. 
Proposition  2  cannot,  in  general,  be  extended  to  the  case  of  elastic  labor  because 
then  we  have  a  second-best problem.  Under  an  interest  rate  rule,  there  is  no  distortion 
on  the  capital  accumulation  equation  and  a  constant  distortion  on  the  labor  supply 
decision.  In contrast,  under  a  money  growth rule,  there  is  a  varying  distortion on both 
margins.  The preferred regime will,  in general, depend on preferences.  However, we  can 
state the  weaker  result  that  an interest  rate  policy  of  Rt  =  1 dominates  a  money  growth 
policy  of  Gt+l  =  P,  since  the  latter  does  not  guarantee  a  zero  nominal  interest  rate 
along  the  accumulation  path.  (Woodford  [1990]  makes  a  similar  point  in  a  variety  of 
'The  one  exceptional'  case  is  separable  preferences  with  log  preferences  over 
consumption, in which case the money  growth and  interest rate regimes are identical.  See 
Fuerst (1994a) for more discussion. 
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As  an  aside,  note  that  under  an  interest  rate  regime  we  need  an  extra  initial 
condition, that  is,  (7)-(9)  impose  no  conditions  on Go  and  thus  none  on po,  wo,  and %. 
This  is  the  standard  result  of  nominal  indeterminacy  under  an  interest  rate  rule  (see 
Sargent  [I9791  or  Sargent  and  Wallace  [1975]),  which  can  be  eliminated  in  the  current 
context  by  specifying the  initial money  stock  (see  McCallum  [1981,  1986]).2  Given  the 
timing  of  the  monetary  injection  in the  model,  the  money  stock  available for use  in time 
0 is MOGO Because we have implicitly set Mo  = 1 under our normalization above, we can 
eliminate the  nominal  indeterminacy by  specifying Go.  Note  that in any  case, there is no 
indeterminacy in the real  variables. 
,- 
4.  The  Stochastic Case without Portfolio Rigidities 
Now,  suppose that  Bt  and  gt  are  stochastic,  but  that  Nt  is  chosen after the  current 
innovations are observed.  Once again we  can eliminate nt,  wt,  and pt.  Using the law  of 
iterated expectations, we  have: 
Uc(t)ct = RtPEtUc(t+ 'kt + pt+  1  (10) 
RtUL("/UC(')  = B,fL(t)  (1  1) 
Uc(')/Rt  = pEt[et+lfk(t+l)+(l-s)luc(t+l)/Rt+ll  (I2) 
Propositions 1 and  2  apply  here  as  well:  An  interest rate  rule  eliminates the  distortion 
on  capital  accumulation  and  thus  is  clearly  the  optimal  monetary  policy  if  we  abstract 
2Woodford  (1994)  demonstrates how  the  homogeneity  property  that gives rise to this 
nominal indeterminacy can also be eliminated by  assuming that changes in the money supply 
are  brought about through  open market  operations rather than through lump-sum monetary 
transfers. 
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generalize  to  the  case  of  elastic  labor  supply,  because  then  we  have  a  second-best 
problem.  However, once again, a peg of Rt = 1 dominates a money growth policy of  Gt+  = 
P. 
The  nominal  indeterminacy  (under  an  interest  rate  peg)  discussed  in  the  previous 
section  takes  on  a  slightly  modified  form  here.  Under  a  peg  of  R,  (11)-(12)  uniquely 
determine  the  behavior  of  Lt  and  kt+l.  This  behavior  is  identical  to  that  in  the 
corresponding  real  business  cycle  economy,  where  the  marginal  utility  of  leisure  is 
proportionally  scaled  upward  by  R.  Given  this  real  behavior,  (10)  then  imposes  the 
following restriction on the money  growth process: 
(PR)-'  = (uc(t)ct)-l  EtUc('+  INt+ lzt+  (13) 
where  zt+  = (1IG  )  The earlier nominal indeterminacy arises here in that there is no  t+l 
restriction  on  the  initial  Go.  However,  even  with  such  a  Go  specified,  there  are  an 
infinite  number  of  money  growth  processes  satisfying  (13).  For  example,  if  U  is 
logarithmic, we  have: 
(P~1-l  = Et(zt++ 
In  this  economy,  only  the  conditional  mean  of  zt+l  matters;  there  is  no  restriction  on 
the  variance  of  z~+~,  nor  on  its  covariance  with  the  technology  shocks.  This  is  an 
economy  in which only expected money  growth matters.  (Lucas and  Stokey  [I9871 make a 
similar point  in  a  similar  context.)  This  indeterminacy  is  something  of  a  nuisance,  but 
has  no  consequence  for  real  variables.  A  natural  restriction on  Gt+l  is  to  assume  that 
it  is  a  time-invariant  function  of  (kt,gt,Ot),  that  is,  Gt+l  =  ~~~~(k~,~~,0t),  with 
npr k  G  ( ss,g,O)  =  Gss.3  A  loose  interpretation  of  this  restriction  is  that  the  Fed  does 
3McCallum  (1983,  1986)  calls  restrictions  of  this  type  the  "minimal  state  vector 
solution.  " 
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Gt+ 1' 
Gt+l 
"pr  k  = G  ( ,,gt,03 = RPEt[Uc(t+ l)ct+ l/Uc(t)ct]. 
Returning to the example of  log preferences, the no-dice restriction implies 
Gt+l = Gss "  t. 
5. The Stochastic Case with Portfolio Rigidities 
The  previous  two  sections  demonstrated  that  under  an  interest  rate  regime,  the 
intertemporal  distortion  on  capital  accumulation  is  entirely  eliminated.  In  this 
section,  we  add  another  distortion  to  the  economic  environment,  namely,  that  household 
portfolio  allocations  respond  sluggishly  to  innovations  in  technology  and  government 
spending.  This  rigidity  is  of  particular  interest  because  many  recent  models  of  the 
monetary  business  cycle use  it  as  a  means  of  modeling  monetary  non-neutrality  (see,  for 
example,  Carlstrom  [1994], Christian0  and  Eichenbaum  [1992,  19941,  and  Fuerst  [1992, 
1994bl).  The  principal  result  of  this  section  is  that  an  interest  rate  rule  also 
eliminates this distortion. 
In  the  PR  case,  nt  is  a  predetermined  variable,  so  we  must  alter  our  solution 
procedure.4  In particular, we  will  solve (2), (3), and  (5) for pt,  wt,  and  Lt: 
4Blanchard  and  Kahn  (1980)  call  a  time  t  variable predetermined  if  it  is  a  function 
only  of  variables known  at  the  end  of  time  t-1.  In the  present  context,  nt  is  a  function 
only of  (kt,Ot-l), both  of  which  are known at the  end of  time t-1. 
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The  effect  of  the  portfolio  rigidity  is  most  easily  seen  in  (15).  In  contrast  to 
equation  (10)  in  the  NPR  case,  in  the  PR  case  the  nominal  interest  rate  is  equal  to 
Fisherian  fundamentals  only  "on  average."  Innovations  in  technology  alter  the  shadow 
value  of  cash  in  the  goods  market  (the  left-hand  side  of  [15])  and  in  the  financial 
intermediary  (the  right-hand  side  of  [15]).  Since  portfolios  are  rigid,  these 
differences  cannot  be  arbitraged  away.  Hence,  there  is  a  non-Fisherian  component  to 
interest  rate  determination.  This  portfolio  distortion  affects  both  the  labor  market  and 
the  capital  market.  As  for  the  labor  market,  the  rigidity  tends  to  make  labor  less 
responsive  to  shocks.5  For  example,  if  U  is  separable  and  logarithmic  in  consumption, 
then  (14)  implies  that  under  a  money  growth  regime,  labor  is  invariant  to  productivity 
and  government  spending  shocks.  The  portfolio  rigidity  also  alters  the  distortion  on 
capital  accumulation,  since  the  non-Fisherian  component  of  interest  rate  determination 
implies  that  (16)  cannot  be  collapsed  into  (12).  This  latter  point  suggests  that  if  an 
interest  rate  peg  eliminates  the  portfolio  distortion,  then  it  will  also  eliminate  the 
capital  accumulation  distortion.  The  goal  of  this  section  is  to  demonstrate  this 
explicitly.  We  will begin with an observation about the portfolio rigidity. 
5Christiano and Eichenbaum (1994) also emphasize this point. 
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interest  rate  regime,  then  a)  the  real  behavior  of  the  economy. is  identical  to  the 
corresponding NPR  economy,  b)  there  exists  a  unique time-invariant central-bank  reaction 
function,  Gt  =  ~~~(n~,~~,0t),  with  G~~(~~~,~,B)  =  Gss,  that  supports  the  interest  rate 
peg,  and  c)  nominal  interest  rates  are  purely  Fisherian.  In  summary,  an  interest  rate 
regime eliminates the portfolio rigidity. 
Proof:  With  no  capital  and  a  constant  interest  rate,  (17)  uniquely  determines  Lt  as  a 
function of  gt  and  Bt,  a  relationship that  is  common to  both  the  NPR  and  PR  models. 
Substituting this  Lt  into  (14),  we  can  uniquely  solve  for  the  time-invariant central-bank 
reaction  function  Gt  =  ~~~(n~,~~,Bt)  that  supports  the  interest  rate  regime,  where 
~P'(n~~,~,0)  =  Gss,  and  nss  denotes  the  value  of  n  in  the  nonstochastic  steady  state. 
This Gt choice implies that the  share of  the money  stock in the intermediary, 
(nt+Gt-l)/Gt,  is ultimately  the same in both the NPR and PR models.  This implies that an 
agent in the PR economy would have no desire to vary  nt  in response to gt and  Bt.  Hence, 
nominal  interest rates are purely  Fisherian, and  (15) is trivially  satisfied. 
Although  Proposition  3  implies  that  an  interest  rate  regime  leads  to  identical  real 
behavior in the NPR  and PR models,  the behavior of  the current money growth rate (Gt) is 
quite  different.6  From  (14),  the  key  variable  is  the  share  of  the  time  t  money  stock 
that  is  in  the  intermediary,  st  =  (nt+Gt-l)/Gt.  In  the  case  of  NPR,  the  previous 
6As  an  aside,  since  pt  = Gt/ct,  differences  in  the  conditional  variability  of  Gt  in 
the  two  models  (NPR  versus  PR)  imply  stark  differences in  the  variability  of  the  price 
level. 
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npr  B  )  so  that  the  household  adjusts  I+  to  ensure  that  st  is  at  the  level  G  t-1 
needed  to  support the  response  of  Lt  to  gt  and  Bt.  In contrast,  in  the  PR  model,  nt  is 
predetermined,  and  the  central  bank  adjusts  Gt  to  ensure  that  st  is  at  the  level  needed 
to  support  the  response  of  Lt  to  gt  and  Bt,  that  is,  Gt  =  #r(nt,gt,~t).  It  is  in  this 
precise  sense  that  an  interest  rate  rule  enhances  the  ability  of  the  PR  economy  to 
respond to real shocks. 
Returning  to  the  model  with  capital,  note  that  the  proof  of  Proposition  3 
immediately generalizes to prove a weaker result: 
Proposition  4:  In  a  PR  economy  with  capital,  if  monetary  policy  operates  under  an 
interest  rate  regime,  there  exists  a  time-invariant  central-bank  reaction  function,  Gt  = 
#r(kt,~,gt,~t),  with  #r(kss,nss,g,B)  =  Gss,  such  that  a)  the  real  behavior  of  the 
economy  is  identical  to  the  corresponding  NPR  economy  operating under  an  interest rate 
regime,  and  b)  nominal  interest  rates  are  purely  Fisherian.  Hence,  an  interest  rate 
regime can eliminate both the portfolio and  capital accumulation distortions. 
Proof:  Under  an interest rate rule,  the  NPR  economy uniquely  determines the behavior of 
Lt  and  kt+l  in response to  gt  and  Bt.  Substituting these  values  into  (14),  we  can solve 
for  the  unique  Gt  =  #r(kt,~,gt,Bt),  with  #r(kss,nss,g,B)  =  Gss,  that  supports  this 
real  behavior.  As  in  the  proof  of  Proposition  3,  st  is  ultimately  the  same  in  both  the 
NPR  and  PR  economies,  so that nominal  interest rates  are purely  Fisherian..  This  implies 
that (15)  is trivially  satisfied, and  (16) collapses to  (12). 
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advantage of  an interest rate policy  over  a money  growth policy.  The numerical  analysis 
is  carried  out  in  three  steps.  First,  the  equilibrium  Euler  equations  are  linearized 
about  the  nonstochastic  steady  state,  and  the  method  of  undetermined  coefficients is  used 
to  calculate  the  two  sets  of  linear  decision  rules  characterizing  the  economy  under  the 
money  growth  regime  and  the  interest  rate  regime.  Second,  after  taking  a  quadratic 
approximation  of  the  value  function  and  utility  function,  the  method  of  undetermined 
coefficients is  used  to  find  the  value  function  under  the  two  monetary  regimes.7  Third, 
and  finally,  the  constant  level  of  capital  subsidy  needed  to  equate  the  unconditional 
expectation  of  the  two  value  functions  is  calculated.  To  be  precise,  let  VR  and  VG 
denote  the  value  functions under  an  interest  rate  and  money  growth regime,  respectively. 
Then-in table  1 we  report the value of  A  that  solves 
EoVR(kl.el,gl)  = E0VG(kl  + Akss,el'gl) 
where  kl,  el, and  gl  are  integrated  over  their  steady-state joint  distribution,  and  A  is 
expressed  as  the  percentage  increase  in  steady-state  capital  that  must  be  given  to 
households  in  the  money  growth  regime  to  make  them  as  well  off  as  households  in the 
interest rate regime. 
Functional  forms  and  parameter  values  were  chosen  to  be  consistent  with  the 
literature.  Preferences are  given by  U(c,l-L)  = [(~~-~-l)l(l-o)  + Aln(1-L)],  where  the 
constant  A  is  chosen to  imply  a steady-state level  of  labor  of  .3.  We  experimented with 
7To  approximate  the  utility  function,  we  need  the  equilibrium  decision  rule  for 
consumption.  For  these  calculations,  we  used  a  linear  approximation  of  the  aggregate 
resource  constraint  to  determine  consumption  behavior.  Of  course,  there  are  other 
possibilities,  including  substituting  the  linear  decision  rules  for  capital  and  labor 
into  the  actual  resource  constraint and backing  out  a  nonlinear  rule  for  consumption.  In 
current work, we  are  exploring the  consequences of  using  these alternative methods (along 
with  the  possibility  of  using  log-linear  decision  rules).  For  a  discussion  of  these 
alternatives, see  Dotsey  and  Mao  (1992). 
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=  5.  We  set  p  =  .99  (implying  a  4  percent  steady-state  annual  real  rate  of  interest). 
Technology  is  Cobb-Douglas,  with  a  capital  share  of  .36  and  a  capital  depreciation rate 
of  6  =  .0175 per  quarter.  We  chose  g  to  imply  a  steady-state gt/Yt  ratio of  .08.  For 
the  stochastic shocks,  we  utilized  the  benchmark  estimates  in  Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and 
Rebelo  (1993):  p8  = .986, o8  = .0089, p  = .982, o  = .015, and corr(y ,E ) = .308. 
g  g  tt 
Finally, for monetary policy, we  set G = .0075 per quarter for the money  growth rule, and 
R  = G/P (or about 7 percent annually) for the  interest rate rule. 
The  numerical  results  are  presented  in  table  1.  Note  that  the  welfare  gain  is 
relatively  large  (as  welfare  numbers  go)  for  either  technology  shocks  alone  or  for 
technology  and  government  spending shocks.  In the  latter case,  a  value  of  2  percent  of 
the  aggregate capital stock  is  a benchmark estimate.8  With U.S.  aggregate net  worth now 
at  approximately  $24  trillion,  the  welfare  gain  amounts  to  $480  billion--a  sizable  free 
lunch.  We  have  two  comments  on  this  result.  First,  these  welfare  numbers  are  quite 
sensitive  to  the  variance  of  the  shocks.  For  example,  as  pg  increases  and  the 
unconditional  variability  of  8  rises,  the  welfare  gain  of  the  interest  rate  regime  grows 
exponentially.  Second,  by  assumption,  the  portfolio  rigidity  disappears  after  one 
quarter.  This  implies  that  the  basic  difference between  the  two  regimes  is  that  under  a 
money growth regime, the market economy responds to shocks with a one-period lag.  To the 
extent  that  the  portfolio  rigidity  is  more  long-lived,  possibly  because  of  portfolio 
adjustment  costs  as  in  Christian0  and  Eichenbaum  (1992),  the  advantage  of  an  interest 
8In  comparison,  Lucas  (1987)  estimates  that  the  welfare  gain  of  eliminating  all 
consumption  variability  is  only  about  .008  percent  of  aggregate  consumption  into 
perpetuity,  or  (in  present  value)  about  .048  percent  of  the  aggregate  capital  stock  (we 
are  using  the  model's  steady-state  real  rate  of  interest  of  4  percent,  and 
consumption/capital  ratio  of  .24,  to  make  this  transformation).  Note,  however,  that 
Lucas'  calculation  is  a  partial  equilibrium  exercise  and  is  thus  not  strictly  comparable 
to the number  we  report. 
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6.  A Real  Indeterminacy  in the Case of  Portfolio Rigidities 
Proposition 4  demonstrates that  in  the  PR  model  with  capital,  there  exists  a  time- 
invariant  central-bank  reaction  function  that  supports  the  interest  rate  peg  and  produces 
the  same real dynamics as in the  NPR  model.  However, this is  not the only  real behavior 
consistent  with  an  interest  rate  peg  in  the  PR  model.  We  will  demonstrate  this  by 
construction.  To  begin,  linearize  the  system  (14)-(17)  about  the  nonstochastic  steady 
state.  For  simplicity,  we  will  set  gt  = g  V  t.  Suppose that  the  central  bank  supports 
the  interest rate peg  with the following reaction function: 
Gt+l 
"pr  k  = G  ( t,g9etI + alEt  + a2Et+1  + a  3  v  t  + a4Vt+1  (18) 
where  G~~~ is  the  central-bank  reaction  function in  the  linearized  NPR  model,  ct  is  the 
time  t  innovation  in  the  technology  shock,  vt  denotes  an  extraneous  or  sunspot  process 
that  is  uncorrelated  with  the  technology  process,  and  Etml(vt)  =  0.9  By  construction, 
(18) satisfies (15).  Substituting (18) into (16) yields  the following linear equation: 
npr 
EtQ  (kt,kf+l'kt+2.Lt,Lt+1,et,et+l)  + 4(a1ct  + a3vt)  = 0 
where anPr  is  the  equation that  results  in  the  corresponding  NPR  economy  and  q  is  a 
constant.  Combining  this  equation with  (17)  gives us  the  law  of  motion  for  capital  and 
labor: 
9As  an  aside,  note  that  in  the  previous  two  sections the  choice  of  Go  was  entirely 
arbitrary,  since  it  was  an  initial  condition  that  only  scaled  all  future  nominal 
variables.  However,  in  the  PR  case,  Go  is  not  an  initial  condition,  since  the  choice  of 
% occurs prior to the revelation of  Go. 
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are  constants.  Note  that  if  al  = a3  = 0, the  real  behavior of  this PR  economy will  be 
identical  to  the  corresponding  NPR  economy.  Substituting  the  law  of  motion  for  capital 
into (14) yields  another linear expression for labor: 
These  two  expressions for Lt  must,  of  course, agree.  If  a  = a  = 0, then  since nt  is  1  3 
predetermined, a4  = 0 and 9  is uniquely determined.  Therefore, if  we restrict the money 
growth  rule  to  depend  only  on  a  minimal  state  vector,  then  the  real  behavior  of  the 
economy  is  unique  and  identical  to  the  NPR  model,  and  there  exists  a  unique  reaction 
function  to  support  the  interest  rate  peg.  (This  is  just  Proposition  4.)  However,  this 
is  clearly  not  the  only  reaction  function  that  will  support  the  interest  rate  peg.  In 
particular,  there  is  nothing  to  pin  down  either  al  or  a3,  since  nt  can  respond  freely  to 
past  shocks.  Given values  for  al  and  a3,  there  will  exist unique  values  for 9  and  a4.10 
Hence,  an  interest  rate  target  can  also  be  supported  with  a  reaction  function depending 
on  sunspots.  Since  the  past  innovation  in  technology  is  not  part  of  the  minimal  state 
vector  that  is  necessary  to  support  an  interest  rate  target,  it  is  also  in  some  sense  a 
sunspot. 
These  sunspots are  reminiscent  of  our  discussion of  the  NPR  model.  To  uniquely 
determine nominal  variables,  a  no-dice  restriction had  to be  imposed.  In general, money 
1ONote  that  there  is  nothing  special  here  about  the  technology  shock  and  the 
indeterminacy  of  al  and  a2.  A  similar  situation would  arise  for  the  case  of  government 
spending shocks. 
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in the PR economy, money growth could depend on sunspots, but unlike the NPR case, these 
sunspots will  have  real  consequences.  Because  of  these  real  consequences, money  growth 
will  need  to  depend  on past  sunspots  (those that  portfolios  can  react  to),  and  on  current 
sunspots as well,  in order to  support an interest rate target." 
An  intuitive  explanation  may  be  helpful.  A  positive  technology  innovation 
increases the  demand  for  labor  and  indirectly raises  the  demand  for  loanable  funds.  The 
latter  effect  will  tend  to  increase  the  nominal  interest  rate.  One  natural  way  of 
preventing  this  is  for  the  central  bank  to  increase  Gt  by  exactly  the  amount  needed  to 
support  NPR  behavior.  However,  we  have just  argued that  this  is  not  the  only  method. 
One  alternative is  to  keep  Gt  the  same  but  to  reduce  labor  supply  so  that  the  implied 
increase  in real  wages  will  eliminate the  increased demand  for  loanable funds.  To reduce 
labor  supply,  the  central  bank  needs  to  stimulate  current  consumption by  lowering  capital 
accumulation.  The  desired  effect  can  be  achieved  by  varying  Gt+l  and  thus  altering 
expected inflation.12 
At  a  more  basic  level,  the  real  indeterminacy  under  an  interest  rate  peg  arises 
here  because  the  standard nominal  indeterminacy  conflicts with the  model's  assumption of 
a  nominal  rigidity  (that  is,  nf  is  predetermined).  In  the  previous  two  sections,  the 
standard  nominal  indeterminacy is  easily  eliminated  by  specifying  the  initial  money  stock 
"Note  that  the  real  indeterminacy  problem  we  are  highlighting  is  quite  different 
from  the  indeterminacy  problem  discussed  in  Blanchard  and  Kahn  (1980),  who  provide 
restrictions  on  the  eigenvalues  of  the  matrix  governing  deterministic  dynamics  that 
ensure  the  existence  of  a  unique  path  to  the  nonstochastic  steady  state.  In  contrast, 
under  an  interest  rate  rule,  the  deterministic  dynamics  of  the  present  model  are  unique 
(because  the  model  is  identical  to  the  corresponding real  business  cycle  economy,  with 
the  marginal  utility  of  leisure  proportionally  increased  by  the  nominal  rate  of 
interest).  Instead,  the  indeterminacy  problem  that  arises  here  concerns  the  impulse 
response to a technology, fiscal, and/or sunspot innovation. 
12This  discussion highlights  why  real  indeterminacy  is  not a  problem in  the  model 
without capital. 
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complicated,  since  nf  is  chosen  before  Gt  is  observed,  so  that  Gt  potentially  alters  real 
activity.  Our  approach  to  resolving  this  problem  is  to  restrict  Gt  to  be  a  time- 
invariant  function  of  the  state  variables--what  Proposition  4  calls  the  central  bank's 
reaction  function,  Gt  =  ~~~(k~,n~,~~,f3~).  (This  is  the  assumption  we  used  in  our 
numerical  calculations  at  the  end  of  section  5.)  This  assumption  of  a  stationary 
reaction  function  is  analogous  to  the  no-dice  restriction  in  the  NPR  case.  Hence,  to 
fully  articulate  an interest rate  policy  in the  PR  model,  one  must  specify both R  and  the 
reaction function the  central bank  uses  to  support R.  (McCallum  [1986, p.  1481  analyzes 
a nonoptimizing model  and  comes to a similar conclusion.) 
7. Conclusion 
Poole's  (1970)  classic  analysis  of  the  targeting  debate  concluded  that,  in  an 
environment with numerous money demand shocks, an interest rate rule is preferred because 
it  lowers  the  volatility  of  output.  This  observation  raises  three  issues:  a)  What  is 
the nature of money demand in our model?  b) Are there money demand shocks in our model? 
and  c) How  do our conclusions relate to Poole's?  We  will  address each of  these issues in 
turn. 
The  typical  criticism  of  the  cash-in-advance  constraint  (relative  to  a  more  general 
transactions-cost  technology)  is  that  it  does  not  allow  for  endogenous  fluctuations  in 
velocity  in  response  to  movements  in  the  nominal  interest  rate.  However,  this  criticism 
seems  unwarranted  in  the  current  context.  It  obviously  does  not  apply  to  the  interest 
rate  regime  where,  by  assumption, the  nominal  rate  of  interest  is  constant.  It  also  does 
not  alter  our  negative  conclusion  on  money  growth  rules  unless  one  makes  the  heroic 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9504assumption that  endogenous movements  in velocity  can replicate the  welfare-improving role 
of  a constant nominal rate of  interest. 
Are  there  money  demand  shocks  in  this  model?  Our  cash-in-advance  assumption 
implies  that  there  are  no  shocks  to  the  payments  technology--one  dollar  of  cash  is  always 
needed  to  conduct  one  dollar of  transactions.  However,  there  are  shocks to  the  demand 
for  transactions.  Positive  technology  innovations  increase  the  firm's  demand  for 
workers,  and  thus  their  demand  for  cash.  Similarly,  positive  government  spending 
innovations  drive  down  the  real  wage  by  increasing  labor  supply,  and  thus  once  again 
increase the  firm's demand for  cash.  Although  in a  general equilibrium environment it  is 
difficult  (if  not  impossible)  to  cleanly  demarcate  IS  from  LM  shocks,  it  is  clear  that 
the shocks in this model do have money demand consequences. 
This  leads  us  back  to  Poole  (1970).  If  we  follow  the  previous  discussion  and 
interpret  the  model's  shocks  as  money  demand  shocks,  our  conclusion  is  similar  to 
Poole's.  We  find  this  quite  remarkable,  since our  modeling  strategy  and  welfare  criteria 
could  not  be  more  different.  The  differences  in  welfare  criteria  illustrate  a  central 
point  of  the  paper.  Poole  advocates  an  interest  rate  rule  (in  the  stochastic  money 
demand  environment) because  it  reduces  the  variability  of  output.  This  paper  advocates 
an  interest  rate  rule  because  it  increases  the  typical  household's  expected  lifetime 
utility  by  providing  more  flexibility  in  responding  to  real  shocks.  For  example,  in  the 
NPR economy operating under a money growth rule, a technology shock will generally cause 
the  nominal  rate  to  deviate  from  the  steady  state,  and  a  time-varying  path  for  the 
nominal  rate  of  interest  distorts  the  capital  accumulation  decision  (see  equation  [12]). 
Similarly,  in the  PR economy operating under a money  growth rule,  the  response of  labor 
input  to  a  technology  shock is  greatly  muted  (see equation [14]).  The  remarkable  fact  is 
that  a  simple  interest  rate  rule  entirely  eliminates  both  of  these  distortions  and  allows 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9504the  household to  respond  more  efficiently  to  technology  and  government  spending  shocks. 
In  sharp  contrast  to  Poole,  this  increased  flexibility  improves  welfare  by  actually 
increasing  output  variability. 
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(expressed as percentage of  steady-state capital stock) 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
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